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BOOK REVIEWS
THE OPPENHEIMER CASE: THE TRIAL OF A SECURITY SYSTEM. By Charles
P. Curtis. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955. Pp. xi, 281. $4.00.
This book contains a detailed discussion of the proceedings in 1953-54
whereby the Atomic Energy Commission decided to revoke the security clearance of its distinguished consultant Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. Dr. Oppenheimer has played an extremely important role in
the atomic energy program since its start, and the Oppenheimer case
has had correspondingly much attention in the press. Such attention is
appropriate, for aside from questions of justice in this case and aside
from the prominence of the individual involved, the faults and virtues
of our security system are so enormously important to the nation that
they deserve frequent and searching examination. Mr. Curtis would
seem well qualified to make such an examination, for he is a lawyer,
experienced in writing, thoughtful and cultured, and clearly much
interested in the case.
The proceedings against Oppenheimer began in July, 1953, with
Lewis Strauss' accession to the Chairmanship of the AEC, at which
time the AEC "initiated steps to organize the removal of classified
documents" from Oppenheimer's custody. The "steps" were slow until
November, when William L. Borden, former secretary of the Joint
Committee of Congress on Atomic Energy, wrote to J. Edgar Hoover
that "more probably than not J. Robert Oppenheimer is an agent of
the Soviet Union," and presented a list of his reasons for thinking so.
Soon thereafter, Oppenheimer having declined an offered chance to
resign without an investigation, his clearance was suspended, he was
ordered to relinquish the classified documents in his custody, and he
was formally charged with various improper actions and attitudes in
a letter to him from General Nichols, the General Manager of the AEC.
Oppenheimer answered the charges in a long autobiographical letter
dated March 4, 1954. By the following month a personnel security
board had been formed to investigate the case and had begun preliminary meetings that were soon followed by the hearing itself. In
describing the Board, Curtis speaks very highly of its three members:
Gordon Gray, President of the University of North Carolina, former
attorney, legislator, publisher, Army Officer, and Secretary of the
Army; Thomas A. Morgan, director of several corporations and retired
President of the Sperry Corporation; Ward V. Evans, Professor of
Chemistry at Loyola University in Chicago, and retired Head of the
Chemistry Department at Northwestern.
The charges investigated by the Gray Board were of six main types:
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(1) that Oppenheimer had, since before the war, associated with many
Communists and fellow-travelers and had hired several of them while
he was Director of the Los Alamos laboratory; (2) that he had
belonged to, or financially supported various Communist-front organizations and the Communist Party itself; (3) that he had lied to security
officers during the war about a Communist attempt to obtain secret
information through his friend Haakon Chevalier; (4) that he had been
unduly susceptible to the influence of the well-known physicist E. U.
Condon, particularly in being persuaded in 1949 to retract publicly
some adverse testimony about one Bernard Peters that he had recently
given before the House Committee on Un-American Activities; (5)
that he had generally been uncooperative with respect to security;
(6) that he had excessively and improperly used his great influence in
opposing post-war work on the hydrogen bomb, having in particular
concealed an opinion in favor of developing the bomb expressed by
G. T. Seaborg, a member of an advisory committee of which Oppenheimer was Chairman.
In reply to these charges, Dr. Oppenheimer stated that he had
never belonged to the Communist Party, though he admitted having
been a fellow-traveler between 1936 and 1941 or 1942 and having made
rather large financial contributions during this period to Communistsupported causes. He claimed that his naive sympathy for Communism
was completely gone by the end of 1942, a claim supported by the fact
that in 1943 he was unwilling to have Communists at Los Alamos, and
by the fact that in 1946 he refused to be associated with the Independent Citizens' Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions. On
the other hand, he never seemed to mind having at Los Alamos presumed former Communists (Bohm, Hawkins, Lomanitz, Weinberg, et
al.) whom he thought to have mended their ways; there was also
evidence that in 1946 he attended a meeting at which Communists
were present and helped the Communist Paul Pinsky analyze some
material to be taken up with the California Legislative Convention.
His association with some former Communists or fellow-travelers
continued into 1954.
The third matter, the so-called Chevalier affair, is considered by
Curtis to have been the most derogatory of all the facts cited against
Oppenheimer. There was little disagreement about what had happened. Early in 1943, one George Charles Eltenton asked Oppenheimer's friend Haakon Chevalier to seek from Oppenheimer certain
secret information about the work at the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory. Chevalier reported the request to Oppenheimer, who in strong
language refused to collaborate. Chevalier expressed agreement with
him, and later relayed the refusal to Eltenton. Some months later
Oppenheimer, feeling that Eltenton was dangerous, told security
officers that Eltenton had sought information from several of the
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Berkeley scientists, all of whom had refused. He repeatedly declined
to name any of the men involved except Eltenton. It was not until
December, 1943, that Oppenheimer, under heavy pressure, revealed
Chevalier's name and admitted that he knew of only the one illicit request for information. Before the Gray Board, Oppenheimer admitted
that he had lied in 1943, saying that it had been very wrong to do so,
that he had been "an idiot," that he had not realized how such false
information would impede the security officers, that he had wished
only to protect his friend Chevalier.
Oppenheimer denied ever having been unduly influenced by Condon.
Such influence was alleged in connection with Oppenheimer's requests
in 1943 for draft deferment for Lomanitz and his testimony as to
Condon's loyalty in 1953, as well as his partial retraction in 1949 of
his earlier testimony about Peters. It seems that in an Executive
Session of the Un-American Activities Committee, Oppenheimer, believing his- testimony to be confidential, stated that Peters had denounced the U.S. Communist Party as a "do-nothing" party and that it
was "well known" that Peters had formerly belonged to the German
Communist Party. After publication of this testimony, he stated in a
letter to a Rochester newspaper that Peters was ethical, honorable, and
presumably loyal, and that he believed Peters' claim of never having
belonged to the German Communist Party; he expressed the hope that
his testimony had not damaged Peters' "distinguished future career as
a scientist." In the hearing, he attributed his having written this letter
to the fact that Bethe and Weisskopf had urged him to right the wrong
his testimony had done. He said that Condon's remarks on the subject
had only made him angry.
Oppenheimer was said to be uncooperative in security matters because of the Chevalier incident, because he requested the deferment of
Lomanitz whom the security men thought disloyal and wished to have
drafted, because in two rather minor matters he refused to answer
questions put to him by the FBI, and because he continued to associate
with Bohm, Lomanitz and Chevalier.
With respect to the H-bomb, Oppenheimer testified that in October,
1949, he had opposed a "crash program" to develop it, partly on moral
grounds, partly because he was not reasonably sure it would work, and
partly because he felt that conventional fission bombs were as powerful as it was practical for bombs to be and would better repay the expenditure of effort. After President Truman had decided to develop the
bomb, Oppenheimer said he had ceased his opposition to it. As for
Seaborg's suppressed opinion, Oppenheimer had received this in a
letter from Sweden and had, he said, filed the letter and forgotten it.
Numerous distinguished men, among them Bush, Conant, Groves,
Kennan, Von Neumann, Lilienthal, Dean, Pike, McCloy, Rabi, and
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Karl Compton, testified unequivocally to Oppenheimer's loyalty,
ability, discretion and character. Curtis quotes only two character
witnesses whose testimony cast doubt on Oppenheimer's qualifications
(though he hints that there were others): DaVid Griggs, who was
unsure of Oppenheimer's loyalty, and Edward Teller, who "assumed"
that he was loyal, but suggested that he was confused.
The Board voted two to one to deny security clearance to Dr.
Oppenheimer. All three members agreed that he was loyal, and remarkably discreet in handling classified information. Gray and
Morgan, in voting not to clear him, gave four reasons: (1) that his
"continuing conduct and associations" had "reflected a serious disregard for the requirements of the security system"; (2) that he was too
susceptible to influence; (3) that his attitudes during the H-bomb
controversy would, if continued, not be "clearly consistent with the
best interests of security"; (4) that he had been "less than candid in
several instances" during the inquiry.
In dissenting from the Board's recommendation, Evans indicated
that he agreed with the majority report with respect to most of the
facts, but remarked that these same facts had been available when
Oppenheimer had been cleared in 1947 and that if Oppenheimer had
changed at all he was more mature and trustworthy in 1954 than he
had been seven years earlier. He felt that failure to clear Oppenheimer
would be "a black mark on the escutcheon of our country," and expressed concern over the adverse effect of such a decision on the future
development of nuclear physics in the United States.
After receiving the Board's recommendations along with those of
General Nichols, the Atomic Energy Commission acted promptly, as
Oppenheimer wished it to, so that its decision might be rendered before
the expiration of Oppenheimer's contract. The decision was negative,
by a vote of four to one. The majority, Commissioners Strauss,
Campbell, Murray, and Zuckert, in their joint opinion, complained of
"fundamental defects in his character," 'as revealed in six incidents:
(1) the Chevalier incident-some doubt is expressed as to which is the
true version; (2) the request for Lomanitz' deferment at a time when
Oppenheimer allegedly knew that Lomanitz was a Communist who
had revealed secret information; (3) Oppenheimer's having, as they
said, made conflicting statements about whether he knew a certain
Communist, Rudy Lambert; (4) the Peters letter; (5) the Seaborg
letter; (6) alleged conflicting statements about the Communist Party
membership of Joseph Weinberg. Of these six charges, those relating
to Lomanitz, Lambert, and Weinberg had never previously been made
known to Oppenheimer. The four Commissioners also indicated that
there had been other damning incidents that they chose not to mention.
Campbell, Murray and Zuckert also appended the separate statements
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justifying their decision. The most interesting of these is Murray's,
for he terms Oppenheimer "disloyal," even though probably not proCommunist nor guilty of revealing secrets. He does so because he
defines "loyalty" to mean obedience to law under a lawful government,
a matter in which he sets extremely high standards for a man in an
important and sensitive position like Oppenheimer's.
Commissioner Smyth dissented from the opinions of the other four,
pointing out that according to the AEC's own criteria "the decision as
to security clearance is an overall, common-sense judgment, made after
consideration of all the relevant information as to whether or not there
is risk that the granting of security clearance would endanger the
common defense or security." He maintained that the decision must
depend on a balancing of the individual's probable future contributions
to the nation if he is cleared against the risk to the nation likely to
result from his clearance; he asserted that the only important risk to
consider is that arising from revelation of classified information, to
which danger all the various security criteria concerning associations,
etc., are ultimately addressed. He concluded from these arguments
that Oppenheimer was eminently fit to be cleared, never having improperly revealed classified information, nor even having violated
subsidiary rules except perhaps in the six instances (he claimed there
were no others) cited by the majority, and having rendered distinguished service to the nation.
Mr. Curtis makes many convincing arguments against the beliefs,
attitudes, and procedures of the Gray Board and of the Atomic Energy
Commission. He criticizes the procedure followed by the Board as
being an illegitimate mixture of the two legitimate methods of trial
and inquiry, a mixture which usually impedes justice; in particular,
he objects to the role of prosecuting attorney played by Robb, the counsel for Board, whereby the inquiry was given the aspect of a trial
without the procedural safeguards of a trial. He objects also to the
Commission's having based its decision partly on three charges which
Oppenheimer's counsel Garrison was never allowed to argue. Even
more strongly, he decries the criteria employed by the Board and
perhaps also by the Commission in making the decision not to clear
Oppenheimer; he maintains that the applicable criteria were those
specifically laid down for such boards by an earlier Commission and
never rescinded, that the judgment should have been "an overall,
common-sense judgment," that a determination should have been
reached "which balances the cost to the program of not having
[Oppenheimer's] services against any possible risks involved." Curtis
thinks it obvious that Robb and Gray were not being guided by such
criteria and suggests that they were influenced by Executive Order
10450, according to which a man's clearance should depend on whether
such action is "clearly consistent with the interests of the national
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security." He says that their adverse decision was based on a mere
doubt rather than an "overall common-sense judgment."
He objects to the criticism of Oppenheimer implicit in the opinions
of Gray and Morgan and of some of the Commissioners, that he had
not been enthusiastic enough in supporting either the security system
or the H-bomb program. Apparently, these men felt that Oppenheimer
quite properly gave the best advice he could in 1949-although they
disapproved of the admixture of moral and political with technical
arguments in his opinions-but they thought that after the President's
decision in 1950 to make the bomb Oppenheimer's continued lack of
enthusiasm had improperly hindered the project. Curtis argues that it
is inconsistent to censure Oppenheimer both for expressing too much
moral "emotion" with respect to the H-bomb in 1949 and for showing
too little of the emotion of enthusiasm in 1950. He maintains that just
as Oppenheimer's stated technical opinions were supposed to be his
own, so should his expressed feelings have been his own, neither suppressed nor distorted into orthodoxy; he denies the Government's right
to command the enthusiasm of its servants. He suggests also that the
Gray Board was inconsistent in. deeming Oppenheimer too influential
in the H-bomb controversy and yet too susceptible to influence in the
matters of Lomanitz' deferment, the letter about Peters, and Condon's
clearance.
Curtis remarks that even if proven such failings as these do not
make a man a security risk, pointing out that the AEC could have
simply dispensed with Oppenheimer's services without' attaching a
derogatory label to him; he rejects Commissioner Zuckert's argument
that the security issue had to be settled so governmental agencies other
than the AEC would be prevented from consulting Oppenheimer on
secret matters. He decries such harsh treatment of one who seems to
deserve it so little.
As for those allegations that Curtis seems to think relevant to
security, he marshals many arguments to the effect that they are
either unproven or unimportant: Oppenheimer's continuing friendship with Chevalier was innocent because the latter had quit fellowtraveling, and his post-war association with Bohm and Lomanitz was
too slight and casual to merit censure; the investigation did not establish that Oppenheimer had made conflicting statements about Weinberg and Lambert during the war; Oppenheimer had not been "less
than candid" during the inquiry but perhaps even too candid; he had
really forgotten the Seaborg letter and had written the Peters letter
because he was too honest to do otherwise; he had long since lost his
sympathy for Communism.
In short, as the title of the book suggests, Mr. Curtis feels that the
Oppenheimer case casts more doubt on the security system itself than
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on Oppenheimer's trustworthiness. The book is indeed a trial of a
security system, or rather it is a mixture of an inquiry with one side
of a trial, in which the system is defendant (without counsel) and Mr.
Curtis is prosecuting attorney. The facts of the case seem to be presented fully and accurately, mainly in long quotations from documents
and from the transcript of the proceedings, but the arguments are so
one-sided and so laden with innuendo that it is very difficult for the
reader to make a balanced appraisal. The author's confession of
prejudice made early in the book does not entirely excuse such a pervasive bias,. which gives to a very complex problem a deceptive
appearance of simplicity. It is unfortunate that the book so discredits
itself, for it does contain an admirable compilation of facts and many
compelling arguments. Indeed, the faults of the secruity system do
seem to be very grievous, and it does seem clear that the AEC was
both unwise and unfair in its treatment of Oppenheimer. These
problems are of such crucial import to the nation that we would have
deserved to have them treated in a book less homogeneously colored.
INGRAM BLOCH'

By Robert E. Keeton. New York: Prentice
Hall, Inc., 1954. Pp. xxiv, 438. $6.65.

TRIAL TACTICS AM METHODS.

Until recently, law teachers and lawyers alike often looked upon
the successful trial lawyer as a rare genius who acquired his qualities
by heavenly endowment, as it is supposed do such great artists as
Beethoven or Rembrandt. It was thought that good trial lawyers came
on earth already inspired, with the combined talents of William Jennings Bryan and Edwin Booth. Every community has one or more
well-recognized, well-advertised, well-equipped and successful trial
lawyers.
Because of this general feeling, lawyers and teachers until recently
have disregarded the study of the art of trial technique. It had
been thought that no study of the subject would tend to improve
without the presence of this divine spark. Recently a number of
studies on the subject have been made, and several text-books and
general treatises have been written. The authors of these works have
not assumed that they will make a scintillating personality of a dullard,
but they do assume that the average well-trained lawyer may improve
his courtroom technique.
Law schools have become aware of this vacuum in their course of
training. The better schools are now offering, usually on an elective
basis, a course on trial technique. I have examined several of the
works of recent date on the subject, and here at Vanderbilt I have
* Associate Professor of Physics, Vanderbilt University.
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taught the'book which is the subject of this review. Mr. Keeton has
stripped this subject of some of its mystery. All of us who have
practiced law for more than a quarter of a century have admired those
who have seemed, by second nature, to be able to unfold to a court
and jury the contention of their clients, in an orderly and sometimes
dramatic manner. Such a lawyer seems to recognize what he should
know; what he should do; and how he should do it.
Lawyers have been inclined to feel, as the public does, when they
see "Mr. District Attorney" and read of Earl Rogers, the great
California "mouthpiece," that these courtroom giants, and even the
local giants they see in the courtroom, are leaping from one inspiration to another. Actually every successful trial lawyer came
endowed with some unique qualifications, but many so endowed have
failed to accomplish success in courtrooms; for these successful trial
lawyers have worked out a plan in their own mind, which they have
gradually adopted over a period of years, without ever formulating
these principles. Each of them follows nearly the same course.
Mr. Keeton in his book, in a very orderly fashion, deals with this
subject, as the successful trial lawyers have done without recognizing
that they are following certain general rules. Each may have a
different manner. One successful trial lawyer may use a "bludgeon"
and another a "rapier," and each be equally successful, but they all
follow certain general accepted principles. Mr. Keeton points out
that they learn to limit cross-examination to the subject matter; they
learn that calling cumulative witnesses is a dangerous practice; they
learn the best order of witnesses; they learn not to ask too many
questions; they have learned how to prepare a case and how to put
their own witnesses at ease in the strange atmosphere of a courtroom. They have even sent young women home to change from
slacks to dresses before taking the witness stand. It is assumed that
they already know the rules of evidence and the law of their case.
I do not know that these books would be of much help to a great
trial lawyer, but I do know that they would confirm the many
strategies that the good trial lawyer has long adopted but never
catalogued. The young and inexperienced lawyer may not know that
you should cross-examine your own client in the privacy of your
own office before you turn him over to your adversary. Many
of these things may seem simple to an experienced trial lawyer,
but I have found in teaching this course that that which we think
is simple is new and novel to the law student.
Mr. Keeton disregards the dramatic stories that we all know, and
treats subjects which a trial lawyer is confronted with daily, by
employing short cases in synopsis form and then discussing the subject.
For instance, he poses the question "Should you purposefully offer
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evidence of doubtful admissibility," and then illustrates the problem
and discusses it. He relates how you can emphasize important parts
of lengthy documents; how you should introduce secondary evidence.
He deals with the subject of how you should react to adverse testimony. We have seen lawyers who usually disdainfully smirk at
every adverse piece of evidence. He deals at some length as to the
best method of portraying evidence, by diagrams, drawings, computations and photographs.
Obviously such a treatise is interwoven with the subject of evidence
and pleading. Mr. Keeton well guides the inexperienced and uninitiated through this maze, which to them would appear to be a
difficult journey, when in fact to the experienced it may be a simple,
straight road. I recommend Mr. Keeton, not only to the law student,
but to the practicing attorney alike.
J.

RAYMOND DENNEY*

MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTIcE.

By

William B. Aycock and Seymour W. Wurfel. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1955. Pp. xviii, 430.
The recent spate of courts-martial in public entertainment media
may well draw the attention of many to the means of punishing the
occasional wayward son in the service. But publicity, per se, does not
insure enlightenment. Just as the popular motion picture Trial does
not purport to reflect the day-to-day business of most lawyers or
judges, The Caine Mutiny Court-Martialdoes not give a true picture of
the frequently prosaic though none-the-less important business of the
military lawyer. Military law is a subject on which enlightenment is
needed in many quarters and Aycock and Wurfel's book, unlike several
on the subject which have appeared recently, is thorough and authoritative. They have mustered to their service a balanced breadth of
experience, study and understanding. It is unfortunate that the book
will perforce have only a limited audience.
General Caffey, Judge Advocate General of the Army, in his introductory note to the book, draws an analogy between the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, which became effective in May, 1951, and a child
'who, during its earlier life, is frequently the cause of so much worry,
care, and annoyance that its parents sometimes wonder whether it is
an asset or a liability." The authors have directed their main effort
to reporting the work of the Court of Military Appeals in interpreting
and applying the Code during this early experience. For that purpose
the coverage necessarily is limited to areas thus far considered by the
Court, but possible problem areas in fields not yet so considered are
* Member, Denney, Leftwich & Glasgow, Nashville, Tennessee.
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also delineated. In the past the main standby of the military lawyer
seeking a standard text on military justice and law has been Colonel
Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, which has been unrevised
for over sixty years. Aycock and Wurfel's book should fill a long-felt
need. The possible objection that the period covered is relatively brief
is completely outweighed by the timeliness of appearance.
Much of the material has appeared previously in law reviews. This
has been added to and spliced into a well-rounded work. In addition
to the coverage of the work of the Court of Military Appeals, and a
detailed annotation of the Uniform Code itself, there is an excellent
brief history of military law and a comprehensive chapter on habeas
corpus as applied particularly to military prisoners. The materials,
particularly the extensive citations, were designed for use by the
military lawyer or the civilian lawyer with a military justice case.
Although a lawyer who has not had contact with the services may find
some terminology of citations in parts of the book to be unfamiliar,
the text itself is thoroughly readable. Particularly well written is the
chapter entitled "Prejudicial Error vs. 'Military Due Process,'" in
which the authors gently chide the Court of Military Appeals for having leaped to glue a label, "military due process," on "the process of
finding and declaring reversible error" and then finding itself stuck
with it like a feather on molasses.
It is to be hoped that this book will set a trend for more scholarly
writing in this field.
JAMES B. EARLE*

WHY JOiNNY CAN'T READ. By Rudolf Flesch. New York: Harper &

Brothers, 1955. Pp. ix, 222.
PLAUN WoRDs: THEm ABC. By Sir Ernest Gowers. New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1955. Pp. viii, 298.
EFFECTIVE LEGAL WRITING.

By Frank E. Cooper. Indianapolis, The

Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1953. Pp. x, 313.
Why Johnny Can't Read evokes almost as much debate as the Cold
War! The book calls to mind the trend in education that began some
decades ago by tossing out Latin as of slight value to anyone except
pharmacists and clerics, and that then proceeded to do away with
several English verbal skills, including spelling and grammar as,
presumably, effete for young people preparing to enter a know-how
society. Meanwhile the public became restless. Perhaps even yet educators are not convinced with Henry Adams, who warned us in
the nineteenth century, that the basis of study ought to be mathematics
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
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and languages; but at least they are questioning the dogma of some
teacher-training centers and a few business administration schools
that pupils must be required at any cost to adjust to the group,
handicapped by an inability to communicate with one another except
by a shoeshine and a smile.
Lawyers, realizing that their only tools are words, have long sought
to require of candidates for the Bar a facility in reading and writing,
including a competence in drafting documents, making speeches, and
doing legal research. The American Bar Association Journal recently
published an article by Professor Harold Q. Pickering entitled "On
Learning to Write."' And Dr. George John Miller gave a vivid
address on legal style at the 1955 meeting of the American Bar Association. 2 One might disagree with Pickering's adulation of Gibbon's
prose, or with Miller's penchant for English rather than American
authorities; but these contributions support the definition of the law
as a learned profession and focus attention on a continuing need.
In fact, articles and speeches may be more significant than the books
that occasionally appear. Few people care to read several hundred
pages on style at a sitting, and a reference work sharpens rather than
creates taste and skill. Yet, Sir Ernest Gowers' book is an aid. He
attacks government agencies: not their policies, but their phraseology.
He accords legal writing more credit than it perhaps deserves, surely
less than Cardozo gave it; 3 and he offers helpful essays on punctuation,
word usage, and choice of words in a manner that is never condescending to adult readers.
Representative law schools along with the lawyers now agree that
a student must project learning, not merely absorb it. To most responsible teachers, the mission of a law school is to train people
to think and to express their thoughts in words. Indeed, the point is
an old one. The famous lawyers of the past, if we are to judge by
eulogies and obituary notices, were nurtured on Shakespeare and the
Bible, and one wonders if Blackstone did not set the pace because of
his eighteenth-century prose rather than the profundity of his thought.
The difference today is that the law schools are re-emphasizing the
verbal skills through what are hoped to be better devices based on a
traditional liberal arts background.
Most schools, for example, are now concerned with giving all
students the benefits long reserved for the few selected for the law
reviews and moot courts. Some law schools offer the type of course
presented by Professor Cooper in his textbook. Its purpose is "to
develop skill in the rhetorical techniques of effective presentation."
1. 41 A.B.A.J. 1121 (1955).

2. The address was based on his article, On Legal Style, 43 Ky. L.J. 235
(1955).
3. CARDOZO,

LAW AND LITERATURE

(1931).
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(p. iii). He encourages separate classes in legal draftsmanship to
buttress the regular subjects. His book, based on his course at Michigan, takes up the writing of opinions, letters, pleadings, briefs, contracts, bills, and statutes, and involves the solution of problems
through the help of examples. As valuable as his work may be, the
fact remains that few wills are exactly alike; and certainly no practitioner wishes to copy one contract from another. A clear legal
document is built up from facts, not deduced from a model:
Perhaps even better than a separate course in writing is the
requirement by some teachers that students draft documents to match
the theory of a particular course. This technique also permits the
instructor to teach grammar and rhetoric without causing the students
to feel that they are taking remedial work. Oddly enough, teachers
most interested in the theoretical component of the law are among
the leaders insisting that the students express their knowledge not only
by the usual examination but by papers and exercises that take
them to the library, the court house, the lawyer's office, and the
teeming world. 4
Several schools offer pioneer work in the nature of semantics. One
such course requires the student to translate a legal opinion into
layman's language.5 This can be a hard chore in technical subjects such
as future interests, bills and notes, and taxation; but it rewards
the student who realizes that he will soon have to explain law to
clients. Such work also helps a student discover for himself that
language has often mastered him, and that he really has said nothing
by such words as contingent, vesting, delivery, and consideration.
Fundamental with all the writers and innovators is the point that
legal writing tends to be heavy. They prefer the Anglo-Saxon word
to the Latin. They dislike the passive voice. They demand the thrust,
not the parry. A tendency to make learning an exercise in pedantics
has doubtless caused the Bar to miss fully achieving its public relations mission.
Of course, some difficulties remain. A number of students enter
4. For example, a property course in the Vanderbilt Law School called for
some unsigned letters from students on the subject of supplementary assignments that included the preparation of a contract, an abstract of title, an
opinion letter, a deed, a bill of sale, and a mortgage. Despite the usual complaint that these papers require much time, the students in part said they
"liked the work"; that it is "practical"; that it "builds self-confidence"; that it
gives them "a review of property courses"; that they get "to see the law as
well as learn legal history." Professor Trautman, who teaches the course, adds
that he considers his assignment in title search, for example, as necessary for
the student to understand the policies of the recording acts and the consequent
alternatives for reform; that he really teaches more rather than less theory.
5. This course offered by Professor Fred Rodell in the Yale Law School is
entitled Law and Public Opinion. Bulletin of Yale University Law School for
the academic year 1955-1956. (1955). It is described in part as, "A workshop
to try to train a few lawyers to write (and speak) about law in language that
a non-lawyer can understand. .. "
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law schools with academic majors in marketing and, say, minors in
archery and marriage-and-the-family. They achieved the distinction of
graduating by fair performance on true-false tests and by a sort of
hearty physical agility and friendliness that characterized them as
leaders. These students, parenthetically, do not always show up too
well in the legal courses in domestic relations or in a study of the
commercial codes, albeit their skill in understanding the mores of
society. Fortunately enough, patient teaching in a language-oriented
law school brings out the latent verbal abilities of these students,
and permits them to add a brain to their splendid physical assets. Once
under way, all law students welcome as a change to the bulk of
case and hornbook law a variety of creative exercises that permit
them to imitate members of the bar.
Unfortunately, some of the leading practitioners who think back on
earlier curricula that offered intellectual content devoid of social
reality, do not fully realize the present shift in emphasis. These
lawyers still enjoy the old quip, "They don't teach in the law schools
what you need in the practice." Their complaint, of course, has not
been unavailing. Leaving aside the question whether any school can
do more than ready a student for the firing line, and admitting that
these new courses cannot as yet suggest more than tentative solutions,
no disinterested observer can deny that law students today are busy
doing rather than memorizing. In fact, Deweyism with its emphasis
on function and adaptation may win its greatest victory through the
conservative forces that continue to insist on reading, writing, and
arithmetic.
Finally, any single article, book, or course on writing may impress
harried citizens as merely a pleasant frill. As a minimum, though,
these writers and teachers all urge that pomposity and artificiality
must go; that sincerity of thought and clarity of expression may cause
many problems to fade away; and they tell us all this with a faith in
the goals man seeks, and with a respect for wit that identifies them
and compliments their readers as civilized human beings.
J. ALLEN SMITH*

THE MORAL DEcIsIoN: RIGHT AM WRONG

IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN LAW.

By Edmond Cahn. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press.
Pp. ix, 315. $5.00.
Although it is fashionable in many quarters, particularly among
the pure scientists of the legal phenomenon, to say that law and morals
are two fundamentally different ways of controlling human behaviour,
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
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no reader of this book will any longer accept that distinction without
affirming at the same time that the realms of law and morals overlap
at important points. Indeed, the author of this book assumes that the
connection between law and morals is so obvious that he feels no
need to prove it. His chief concern is centered on a far more vexing
problem, namely: granted that American courts of law must be guided
by moral insights in the solution of cases which involve all the ramifications of man's life, whose moral insights should prevail? Hence,
this book is not solely a study of the moral content of the decisions of
American courts, but, taking these moral expressions of the judges
as a starting point it is a fascinating essay in moral philosophy. And
the importance of the book derives not from the author's giving us a
"system" of ethics or even at all points an acceptable moral insight,
but rather from his clear perception that the enterprise of law is deeply
implicated in the moral capacity of human beings and is animated by
the articulated, as well as mystically brooding, moral impulses of man.
I.
The courts are asked to decide momentous questions at each critical
stage of a human being's life and at each of these stages grave moral
questions arise. From the beginning, there is the question concerning
the ground of a person's right to life. Any one who pushes the argument even one step behind the phrase "human dignity" is aware
that the basis of human value is not self-evident to all nor is it easy to
prove, especially from empirical evidence. Equally debatable are the
rules governing the various aspects of man's conduct and relations.
The courts must wrestle with the complications of sexual relationships
and the ground rules for marriage and the family, trying to steer a
clear course upon a sea that shifts disconcertingly and moves from
depths not readily discernible. When a man moves beyond the family
into the arena of business, even there the claims of morality reach out
to him and become insinuated into the law whereby the law looks at
his honesty and his intentions as well as the quality of his loyalty to
his associates. The realm of property is not exempt from this scrutiny,
for some of the fiercest debates in our time have raged over the
morality of the institution of private property, a debate that is clearly
reflected in the decisions of the courts and in the struggle to shift
to government those tasks which another generation fought to keep
in the hands of individuals. Nor has the law closed its eyes to behaviour which is best described as that of the "good Samaritan," even
though in an earlier era of stricter legalism Ames could argue that
the law does not require active benevolence between man and man.
At the end, there are disability and death, around which there cluster
a variety of moral questions, including such items as mercy killing
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of the hopelessly incurable and the curious tendency of the dying man
to invent ways of asserting his reluctance to satisfy the tax collector,
or by expressing a final resentment at one who stood near to him in
life, all this in an instrument whose morality and legality are
simultaneously probed. This is the wide variety of human involvement
with things and persons which creates cases in the courts and which
compel the courts to absorb and employ moral insight. It is around
this spectrum of cases that the major part of the book is organized.
II.
Behind the writing of this book is the author's concern over the
breakdown of morality in modern civilization. Men no longer see
a clear standard for the moral life and hence their sense of right
and wrong has become dangerously weakened. For the lawyer and
the courts this situation poses a difficult problem because the courts
are forced to construe and apply moral standards to concrete cases.
But the vital nerve of a living morality has been deadened in our
day by the twin forces of (a) skepticism, which looks at morals as
being at best simply local community mores and (b) contumely with
which any system of ethics is regarded which claims to find its
authority in nature and ultimate truth. Against these, the author
replies, on the whole satisfactorily, arguing that even the most
authoritarian morality has in time revealed its relative nature when
faced with the contingencies of history; and as for morality as mere
mores, the sense of right within man's conscience testifies to the inconclusiveness of mores in defining the moral obligation of man.
The author would look for a solution of man's moral quest not in
community mores nor in authoritative religions but rather in man's
"moral constitution," which is more than just his faculty of reason
for it includes "the emotions, the glands, the viscera to join the faculty
of reason in the experiences of a moral evaluation." (p. 19).
III.
Since it is not the author's intention to outline a system of ethics for
the lawyers' use, the reader will not find in this book any complete
treatment of right and wrong. He will instead be stimulated to
think for himself about the vexing moral questions which the above
mentioned aspects of life thrust up to the law. Whenever the author
does express his own philosophy, it usually conforms to the articulated
insights of jurists with whom he shares a deep measure of affinity.
In an otherwise brilliantly reasoned book the loosest logic and most
imprecise argument are found in the author's treatment of the family
and sex, for here he wrestles with the multiple factors of actual ex-
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perience, Freudian analysis and the "moral constitution" of man,
factors which seem too bewilderingly disruptive to stay within the
boundaries of any clear notion of right. For example, he argues that
"if we are to be guided by what I have called the 'morals of the last
days', the family has no strong claim to survive." (p. 78). Then he
incorrectly supports this view by reminding us that Jesus "repudiated
his family." What Jesus did is what any good parent would encourage,
namely, to be true to one's highest insights. But this does not call
for the "repudiation" of the institution of the family. That the family
arrangement does at times exhibit "strangeness and even absurdity"
is not sufficient ground for dissolving it: strangeness and absurdity
are not, as the author holds, "inherent" in the family and can be
corrected. And his eloquent description of the family as a "unique
emotional matrix" leads him to consider it the most suitable context
for the child, for "where could there be a more favorable background
for sympathetic instruction and effortless learning than a really
harmonious family home"? (p. 85). Yet anyone who has dealt with
the problem of achieving a really harmonious home would not advocate
that "an enlightened moral classification-the kind we are seeking
here-will not run along the traditional boundary line fixed by legal
marriage, separating the permissible intercourse within the borders
of wedlock from all outside, presumedly vile types of sexual connection." (p. 93). Undoubtedly, the author rightly focuses attention
upon many abuses which a strict enforcement of authoritarian sex
and family ethics can produce, but this hardly justifies a wholesale
sardonic appraisal of marriage which one is more accustomed to find
in Jonathan Swift.
Nevertheless, this is a literary achievement of the highest merit.
It is written with the rarest kind of concreteness in a field where
authors usually wallow in the wastelands of meaningless abstractions.
At times the book is almost poetic in quality yet it never loses the
sense of vividness and immediate relevance. This should guarantee a
wide reading of this exciting book, and it would deserve such a reception for it has addressed itself in an uncommonly stimulating way to
the common problems of every man and the law.
SAMUEL ENocH STuMPF*
* Chairman, Department of Philosophy, and Lecturer in Jurisprudence in
the Law School, Vanderbilt University.

